Medical Marijuana

Today, the Supreme Court held that it is a crime to grow and use marijuana, even for medical purposes -- thereby upholding the federal Controlled Substances Act and striking down California Proposition 215.

This is one of those rare Supreme Court cases where my public policy preferences and my jurisprudential policy principles are in some degree of conflict.

The outcome itself is profoundly good and right from a public policy standpoint. The regime set up in California in the wake of Proposition 215 was little more than an exercise in incrementally obtaining the legalization of marijuana -- a bad idea for moral and health reasons. A terrible idea, in fact, as was Proposition 215. So I'm glad about the result.

The reasoning of the case is solid, as well -- evidenced by the fact that Justice Scalia is part of the majority. But there are some features of it that trouble me. It relies on a very expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause, holding that Congress can regulate even incidental intrastate (within a state) activity that's not commercial, so long as Congress concludes that failing to do so would undercut the regulation of the interstate market. And it relies on a very sweeping case to that effect from the New Deal era, where a farmer was prohibited to grow more wheat than he was allocated under the Agricultural Adjustment Act -- even though it was for his own private use and not for the market.

Using the proper level of analysis (i.e. ascertaining that there is a "rational provision" for the provision of the Controlled Substances Act at issue), the Court concluded -- presumably apart from any of the majority's policy preferences -- that Congress did, indeed, have a rational basis for concluding that allowing people to grow and smoke their own pot would, in fact, leave a "gaping hole" in the Controlled Susbtances Act.

As relieved as I am about the result, and though the reasoning is solid (no dependence on foreign law, for example), there are some aspects of the decision that trouble me. As someone who believes the federal government's powers should be narrowly defined, it is troubling to think that the federal government's power can extend to (as Justice Thomas pointed out) any product that's never been bought or sold, never crossed state lines, and with no demonstrable effect on the national market for it.

And, as Justice O'Connor points out, "to draw the line [allowing federal regulation] wherever private activity affects the demand for local goods is to draw no line at all" -- in other words, to implement a federal police power. That's a scary thought to any conservative and advocate for limited government.

Bottom line: Good result from a public policy standpoint; a bit more troubling on the jurisprudential policy front.