Who Knew What -- and When?
More from Fox News on the unbelievable 9/11 Commission story.
Now it appears that Commission staffers were briefed -- not once, but twice -- about the military intelligence unit called "Able Danger" and that Mohammed Atta's name had been specifically brought up to the Commission staff. The Commission has already admitted that Atta's name came up in a July 2004 meeting (in the context of "Able Danger" having identified him as an Al Qaeda in America in late 1999) -- just two weeks before the Commission report was due. Now it appears that Able Danger briefed the staff about the matter in October of 2003, as well.
Commission members are saying that staff may have known the information, but they did not. If they did not, then why? If they did, why wasn't it in the report?
Seems to be that the Commission's spokesman gives the game away in saying, "The information that he provided us did not mesh with other conclusions that we were drawing."
So instead they decided to bury the information? What would have been the harm in simply noting the existence of this contradictory evidence?
It's hard to escape one conclusion: That's there's reason to believe Commission staff at the very least hid facts that would have indicated that (1) the Clinton Administration made a HUGE mistake when its Pentagon lawyers prevented Able Danger from turning over information about Atta to the FBI; and/or (2) new information about Atta's presence in the United States disturbed the nifty timeline that eliminated any suggestion that Al Qaeda Atta had met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague (thereby indicating links between Saddam and Al Qaeda).
This is being called "the story of the summer." And it is.
Now it appears that Commission staffers were briefed -- not once, but twice -- about the military intelligence unit called "Able Danger" and that Mohammed Atta's name had been specifically brought up to the Commission staff. The Commission has already admitted that Atta's name came up in a July 2004 meeting (in the context of "Able Danger" having identified him as an Al Qaeda in America in late 1999) -- just two weeks before the Commission report was due. Now it appears that Able Danger briefed the staff about the matter in October of 2003, as well.
Commission members are saying that staff may have known the information, but they did not. If they did not, then why? If they did, why wasn't it in the report?
Seems to be that the Commission's spokesman gives the game away in saying, "The information that he provided us did not mesh with other conclusions that we were drawing."
So instead they decided to bury the information? What would have been the harm in simply noting the existence of this contradictory evidence?
It's hard to escape one conclusion: That's there's reason to believe Commission staff at the very least hid facts that would have indicated that (1) the Clinton Administration made a HUGE mistake when its Pentagon lawyers prevented Able Danger from turning over information about Atta to the FBI; and/or (2) new information about Atta's presence in the United States disturbed the nifty timeline that eliminated any suggestion that Al Qaeda Atta had met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague (thereby indicating links between Saddam and Al Qaeda).
This is being called "the story of the summer." And it is.
1 Comments:
Matt Brinkman wrote: That's right, it is all Clinton's fault that 9/11 happened.
Admitting it is the first step toward healing.
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